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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the combination of institutional factors and 
technology advances as determinants of payment systems choice. The theoretical set up suggests that 
countries entering into a new institutional environment approach accepting group attitudes towards 
payment choices as a consequence of institutional pressure and technology development. We apply 
the results of the model to 2004 European Union enlargement process. Results confirm the relevance 
of both institutional environment and technology development in retail payment system decisions of 
newly acceded countries. 
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Introduction 
Continuous evolution of information technology has led to a significant transformation of payment 
industry (Evans and Schmalensse, 2009). The degree of technology development is a key element in the 
decision to move from cash or paper to electronic means of payment. Previous papers have stressed the 
relevance of technology in consumer payment choice. Markose and Loke (2003) show that the decrease 
in the use of cash and its substitution by cards is affected by the availability of payment terminals at the 
point of sale. Ireland (1994b), Marquis and Reffett (1994), English (1999) and Hromcová (2008) relate 
the choice of payment instruments also to the technological progress. Empirically, Humphrey et al. (1996) 
find that the availability of new payment systems, which means the existence of the corresponding 
technology at the disposal of consumers, explains part of the differences found in payment use in a group 
of developed countries. Snellman and Virén (2009), Ferrari et al. (2010) and Yang and Ching (2010) have 
offered evidence on the impact that automatic teller machine networks have in consumers' decisions. 
Scholnick et al. (2008) analyse the relationship between different payment technologies and conclude that 
payment transactions at the point of sale (POS) and cash withdrawals at automatic teller machines (ATM) 
are substitutes. Hayashi and Klee (2003) and Anguelov et al. (2004) show that general technology 
adoption by consumers is positively related to the use of electronic payments. 
Development of new payment technologies does not imply the elimination of traditional methods. 
Consumers ultimately determine which of these instruments they actually use. Once consumers and 
merchants get comfortable with a particular technology, they need a compelling reason to switch to 
another. First of all, for a new method of payment to be successful, it must attract substantial number of 
users, offer significant cost savings or added convenience relative to existing payments technologies or 
methods. Second, whatever its cost or convenience, a payment system must be trustworthy and secure, or 
people will not use it (Litan and Baily, 2009). The existence of a sound and reliable institutional 
environment could clearly help consumers' perception of security and convenience. National and 
supranational regulations can provide additional incentives to users and thereby accelerate the acceptance 
of a particular payment instrument. The effect the institutional environment and national regulations have 
in shaping financial market design has been claimed in previous studies (La Porta et al., 1997). These 
effects could also have an influence on retail payments choice and development. In fact, the work by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems on the minimum institutional requirements payments 
systems must have is considered to serve as a guide to develop them (BIS, 2005). To the best of our 
knowledge the combination of institutional factors and technology advances has not been analysed 
together as possible determinants of payment choice. 
This paper tries to fill this gap by focusing on institutional and technological characteristics both from a 
theoretical and empirical point of view. In particular, the paper analyses how the process of entering an 
economic and monetary union, and the influence of new institutions together with the technology 
advances derived from this integration, could shape the evolution of consumers' payments in newly 
acceded countries (NAC). The conclusions of the theoretical analysis are then tested on the particular case 
of European Union (EU) enlargement to Eastern European countries. This context is particularly 
challenging because the enlargement process has proven to be successful in providing institutions' 
building and structural transformation to Eastern European countries (Dabrowski and Radziwill, 2007). 
On May 1st, 2004 the EU welcomed 10 more countries as a part of its largest enlargement ever. The 
accession of the new members increased the EU population by nearly 20% but the EU's total gross 
domestic product (GDP) increased just 4% (Hildebrandt, 2002).5 The NAC accession negotiations 
required the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the set of laws that underpin the common 
market. As a result, NAC financial systems were expected to be transformed to such an extent that the 
supervisory and legal framework reached more or less EU standards. Moreover, EU financial sector has 
also been experiencing a profound change - deregulation, disintermediation, technological change and 
single currency - representing, in fact a moving target to the NAC's authorities (Stirbu, 2004). 
In light of the above discussion, the first objective of the paper is to develop a theoretical model that can 
describe the effects that, in terms of the existence of technology advances, the accession to an economic 
and monetary union can have on household payment choice and intermediation costs. We assume that 
consumers have two ways of acquiring consumption goods, cash and electronic payments, and that 
technology is crucial for the development of the payment system. We introduce payment system 
                                                 
5
 Including Romania and Bulgaria that entered in 2007. 
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characteristics from Hromcová (2008) into the model of Ireland (1994a). In a resulting model, knowledge 
improvement leads to more sophisticated payment system and cheaper electronic transactions. In the 
process of accession, the less developed economy (accessing country) gradually adapts to the payment 
system of the more developed economy (accepting country). As a consequence, agents' payment choice 
approaches the one of the consumers in the country with more developed payment system. The second 
objective of the paper is to estimate the results of the model. For that, we use data on EU payment 
systems for countries accessing in 2004 and those accepting the NACs. Furthermore, data availability 
allows us to study the joint effect of institutional environment and technology development on payment 
decisions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical model. Section 2 presents 
the empirical analysis. Finally, we conclude. 
1. Theoretical Model 
    We will consider two economies which differ in the initial level of development. At the beginning they 
are two separated islands and can have different monetary policies. With the accession moment 
approaching, their monetary policies must converge and at the moment of accession a common monetary 
policy applies in both islands. After the unification takes place, the accessing country is gradually 
adopting the payment system technology of the more developed one. They maintain their own structure 
and other variables unchanged otherwise. Technology level is crucial for the payment system. The higher 
the technology achieved, the cheaper the non-cash payments. As a measure of technology, we will use the 
level of capital in the sense of the learning-by-doing model, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Because the 
learning-by-doing model can be reduced to an AK model, for simplicity of our theoretical setup, we 
assume that the production function has the linear form. However, we keep reminding the reader that the 
level of capital is the measure of achieved knowledge, and higher knowledge leads to higher 
technological level. 
    In the description of the model we follow closely Ireland (1994a) and Hromcová (2008). The behaviour 
of households in both islands is analogous. Therefore, we present the model for the island which begins 
with lower level of technology and at the end of the section we generalise the model for the other island. 
1.1 Accessing country.  
1.1.1 Household Problem 
    The economy consists of a large number of infinitely lived households. All households have identical 
preferences, production and trade opportunities. Households inhabit the following environment: they face 
continuum of spatially separated markets, which are indexed by j[0,1]. All households live in market 0, 
and the index j indicates the distance from home. In each market j a distinct perishable good is produced 
and sold in every period. Goods are thus indexed by j, which corresponds to the market of both 
production and trade. The representative household has the preferences given by 
( )[ ]∫∑
∞
=
1
00
djjcu t
t
tβ
   (1) 
where β is the discount factor, ct(j) is defined as the consumption at period t of the good produced in 
market j, u(⋅) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, with lim t→∞ 
u′[ ct(j)] = ∞. 
    The production and trade is like in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each household is composed of a worker-
shopper pair. Prior to any trading, government fixes the level of the gross nominal interest rate Rt+1 
between periods t and t+1. We will assume that Rt+1>1. Agents enter the period t with certain amount of 
monetary balances Zt and the debt Bt, carried over from the previous period, and the capital stock kt that 
represents the technology level achieved. A representative worker decides to produce on any of the 
markets j via the net production function 
 yt =Akt     (2) 
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where A is the net productivity of capital.6 
First, the goods market opens and consumption takes place. Worker stays at the market j during the whole 
period. Shopper visits various markets to acquire consumption goods carrying all the monetary balances 
of the household. Two ways of acquiring consumption goods are allowed: using money or electronic 
payments. All goods purchased with government issued money will be referred to as cash goods. Goods 
purchased via electronic payments will be referred to as electronic goods. Nominal monetary balances Zt 
can be used to buy goods in some of the markets indexed by j. Cash purchases are subject to the liquidity 
constraint 
                                                                   
( )[ ] ( ) ,1
1
0 t
t
tt p
Zdjjcj ≤−∫ ξ
                                                   (3) 
where ( ) 0=jtξ  if a good is purchased on market j with cash, or ( ) 1=jtξ if a good is purchased on 
market j via an electronic payment and tp  is the price level. 
As said above, agents can use an electronic payment to pay for the consumption. The financial 
intermediary enables electronic payments at a cost ( )jtγ  that is given for each market j and period t. The 
part of output that is not consumed is devoted to the investment into capital. After the goods market 
closes, the monetary holdings of agents are augmented by a lump sum transfer tX  from the government. 
The amount 
tX  is endogenously determined in the system according to the given nominal interest rate, so 
that the money demand is totally satisfied. As the next step, the securities market opens. During the 
securities trading session households choose their currency holdings 1+tZ . They also purchase (or issue) 
one-period nominally denominated pure discount bonds paying 1+tB  units of money at period t+1 while 
they cost 
1
1
+
+
t
t
R
B
 units of money at period t. Bonds are in zero net supply. The budget constraint agents are 
facing can be written 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,
1
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+∫ γξ     (4) 
1.1.2 Financial Intermediation 
We assume that the intermediation cost must be paid by the buyer, as motivated in Ireland (1994b). To be 
able to purchase without cash, some resources must be devoted to making the non-cash payment itself 
available such as checking the identity of the buyer or his ability to pay. When the shopper is far away 
from home (market zero) the communication becomes more difficult, and therefore we assume that the 
payment to the intermediary increases with j. The process of learning-by-doing gives a potential for the 
development of new technologies. It also leads to an increase in income per worker and higher 
consumption. Higher purchase means that checking the ability of the buyer to pay is more relevant. The 
development and diffusion of new technologies allows decreasing the processing costs. 
The real payment made to the intermediary is characterized by a function that fulfills properties found in 
some empirical studies, as described in Hromcová (2008): the intermediation cost is lower in richer 
countries, the cost of intermediated payment diminishes over time, and the cost elasticity is close to zero, 
i.e. the cost is proportional to consumption purchase. We specify the intermediation cost function as a 
composition of three parts 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].log jckj tnconsumptiotytechnolocationt γγγγ =⋅   (5) 
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 Thanks to the AK technology, we can write the net production function as yt = (A’ + 1 – δ) kt. It corresponds to the 
one defined in the equation (2), where A′ is the marginal productivity and δ is the depreciation of capital. 
5 
 
The time independent part of the payment, ( )jlocationγ  is strictly increasing with the distance from home, 
strictly convex, twice continuously differentiable, and similarly to Ireland (1994a) we assume 
 
 ( ) 0=jlocationγ  and ( ) .lim ∞=
∞→
jlocation
t
γ                          (6) 
The function ( )tytechno klogγ  is strictly decreasing, strictly convex, twice continuously differentiable and 
( ) .0lim log =
∞→
t
ytechno
t
kγ  The time dependent part of the intermediation cost, ( )tytechno klogγ , embodies the 
effect of new technologies on the cost. It includes the state of the technology frontier as well as the net of 
electronic infrastructures to perform the electronic payments. This cost decreases as the level of 
technology develops. The more capital is accumulated, the more knowledge is available, better 
technologies can be developed and cheaper intermediation services can be offered. The other time 
dependent part of the intermediation cost, ( )[ ]jctnconsumptioγ , is increasing, linear in consumption and 
( )[ ] .0=jctnconsumptioγ  
We thus concentrate directly on the effect of new technologies on the intermediation cost. However, the 
scale economies are also present, because higher stock of knowledge is associated with higher volume of 
transactions. 
 
1.1.3 Payment choice 
Consider a given level of tk . The cost of cash goods is the same in all markets, it corresponds to the 
nominal interest rate. The cost of electronic goods increases with the distance from home, taking into 
account the assumption on the time independent part of the intermediation cost ( )⋅locationγ , equation (6). 
Whenever ,11 >+tR there will exist at each time t an interval of markets where the intermediation cost for 
electronic purchases is lower that the nominal interest rate, and an interval where it is higher. Therefore, 
there will exist a market with cutoff index ( )1,0∈ts , such that in all markets with indexes tsj <  
consumers will use electronic payments and in all markets with indexes tsj ≥  consumers will use cash 
to acquire the consumption goods. Thus households will choose cash goods in markets far away from 
home (market 0) and electronic goods in markets close to home.7 
 In the cutoff market consumers are indifferent between using cash or electronic payments. We arbitrarily 
assume that cash will be used at the cutoff market. In our specification the level of new knowledge 
increases over time. Changes in tk  affect the payment to intermediary via ( )tytechno klogγ . Technology 
development and interest rate are thus factors that affect the cutoff index ts : an increase in the level of 
technology, tt kk >+1 , implies lower intermediation cost and therefore, electronic payments will be 
employed in higher fraction of the markets, tt ss >+1 ; an increase in the nominal interest rate, tt RR >+1 , 
increases the opportunity cost of holding money, and cash will be employed in lower fraction of the 
markets, tt ss >+1 .  
Define 
                                                 
7
 What is important here is that the consumer chooses the point of division on the continuum of markets. One could 
construct the model in a way that cash is employed in markets close to home and credit in markets far away from 
home following the approach of Gillman (1993), for example, by employing a payment function which reflects 
the time spent at store when buying with credit or cash. Such assumption would not change the conclusions of our 
model, however. 
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The functions ( )jct0  and ( )jct1  characterise the cash and electronic consumption per market j, 
respectively. 
 
1.1.4 Equilibrium 
Definition: Given the set of initial conditions 1111 ,,, pBZk  and the sequence of nominal interest rates 
{ }∞
=+ 01 ttR , the equilibrium consists of sequences ( ) ( ){ }∞=++++ 1111110 ,,,,,,,, ttttttttt pXsBZkjcjc  such that 
(a) a representative household is maximizing the discounted utility (7) subject to the budget constraint (8) 
and the cash-in-advance constraint (9), choosing the sequences ( ) ( ){ } ,,,,,, 111110 ∞=+++ ttttttt sBZkjcjc  
(b) markets for goods, money and bonds clear in every period, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,1 1
00
10
∫ ∫∫ ++++=
t
tt
s
t
s
t
s
ttt kdjjdjjcdjjcAk γ   (7) 
,1 ttt XZZ +=+     (8) 
.01 =+tB     (9) 
Let tλ  and tη  be the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constrain (4) and the 
cash-in-advance constraints (3), respectively. The equations that characterize the equilibrium are the 
above mentioned market clearing conditions (7), (8), (9) and the first order conditions on consumption, 
capital, nominal balances, nominal bonds and cutoff index, respectively, 
( )[ ] ,' 0 ttt jcu ηλ +=    (10) 
( )[ ] ,' 1 tt jcu λ=    (11) 
,1Att += βλλ    (12) 
,
1
11
+
++ +
=
t
tt
t
t
pp
ηλβλ    (13) 
,
1
1
1
+
+
+=
t
t
t
t
t
p
R
p
λβλ     (14) 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ),0110 ttttttttttttt scsscscuscu ηλγλ +++−=−   (15) 
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Using (10), (11), (13) and (14), we can rewrite the first order conditions on both consumptions as follows: 
( )[ ] ,' 0 ttt Rjcu λ=     (16) 
( )[ ] ,' 1 tt jcu λ=    (17) 
From the first order condition (15) we get the payment to the intermediary to be paid at the cutoff market 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( ),,,1, 1001 ttttttt
t
ttt cRcRRcucukRs λλλλλγ −+−=   (18) 
Taking into account the expressions (16), (17) and (5), the equilibrium on the goods market (10) can be 
rewritten as 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
,,
1
,
1
,
0
,
0
10
∫ ∫∫ ++++=
tt
tttt
kRs
t
kRs
t
kRs
tttt kdjjdjcdjRcAk γλλ   (19) 
The current period output is spent between cash consumption, electronic consumption, payment to the 
intermediary and investment. The real monetary balances, ,
t
t
t p
Z
m = which equal the amount of cash 
consumption purchased in all markets, are 
( )[ ] ( ).,,1 0 ttttt RckRsm λ−=    (20) 
The consumption via financial intermediaries, which equal the amount of electronic consumption 
purchased in all markets, is 
( ) ( ),, 1 tttt ckRse λ=    (21) 
Thus the ratio of cash and electronic payments is dependent on the specification of the intermediation 
function, specification of the utility and the monetary policy in the previous period. 
In order to see the behavior of the cash to electronic payments ratio we set up a parametric example with 
the CES utility function 
       





≠
−
=
=
−
−
1          1
     ,1                 ln
)(
1
1
θ
θ
θ
θ
forc
andforc
cu                                                                                (22) 
where θ>0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and the following proportional 
intermediation cost 
( ) ( ) ( ).
1
1log
tt
ytechno
t ckj
jj λγγ
−
=    (23) 
We can then write the cutoff index combining (26) and (21) in the following form 
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The cutoff index describes the proportion of markets in which agents employ services of the intermediary. 
From (12) we can get the evolution of the marginal utility of consumption, we can see that its growth rate 
is constant over time. The ratio of cash to electronic consumptions can be expressed as 
( )
( ) θφ
γ
1
log
tt
t
ytechno
t
t
RR
k
e
m
=     (26) 
The technology level (the part of the intermediation cost function that depends on the technology) and the 
monetary policy affect the composition of the payment methods as follows (recall that we assumed that 
the capital affects negatively the intermediation cost) 
( ) 0<
t
tt
dk
emd
  and  
( )
.0>
t
tt
dR
emd
   (27) 
 
1.2 Accepting Country 
The specification of the accessing and accepting economy is the same. When writing the version of the 
model for the accepting country we use the analogous notation, substituting lower-case letters for capital 
letters and capital letters for blackboard bold ones, i.e. the level of technology in the accepting country 
will be denoted as ,tK the nominal interest factor between t and t+1 as R .t   
1.3 Accessing Economy Before and After 
Both economies know both initial conditions and when the accession takes place, i.e. accessT  is given. 
Both economies can solve their respective maximization problems as all information is available to 
everyone. After the accession, the accessing economy is adopting the payment technology of the 
accepting country. We define accesstk  as the level of technology that determines the intermediation cost at 
each market after accession. Given that the accessing country's payment technology converges to the 
accepting one, the gap between the payment technologies of both countries will be diminished over time. 
The evolution of accesstk  will reflect the payment technology differences and will be a function of the 
levels of the payment technologies in both groups of countries ( )taccesstaccesst Kkk ,1−Ω= , where 
t
access
ttT
access
Tt
access
tt KkkkKkk accessaccess ==<≤ ∞→lim,,  and tk  denotes the level of capital in an 
economy that evolves independently of the accepting country because it does (did) not access, 
access
tk accounts for the payment technology (capital) in the country where the accession actually 
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happened, and tK is the level of capital in the accepting country.8 
The intermediation cost function would be slightly modified and the ratio between the cash and electronic 
consumptions after the accession, equation (26), depends on the payment technologies of both groups of 
countries and the common monetary policy, =tR R t . That implies that for given levels of payment 
technologies and a given monetary policy, any decrease in the real balances will have to be accompanied 
by an increase in the electronic goods. It also implies that the accession, that means higher level of 
payment technology, ,t
access
t kk > induces a drop in the ratio of cash and electronic payments, as implied 
by (27). 
2. Empirical analysis 
According to equation (26) and the argument at the end of section 1.3., the use of alternative means of 
payment in the accessing countries is a function of the monetary policy as well as the technology level in 
the accessing and accepting countries. We interpret ( )tt Kk  as the level of technology achieved and as the 
set of infrastructures developed to make payments. In order to empirically estimate this relationship, we 
take logs. Therefore, the baseline specification to estimate is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ittitititit KkRem εααα ++−+= /ln1/ln 210   (28) 
where i is accessing country and t is time. Variables m/e, R-1, k/K account for cash to electronic 
operations (dependent variable), nominal interest rate, and the ratio of payment technology level in the 
accessing countries to the payment technology level in the accepting countries (thus no index i), 
respectively. The error term εit is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ², εit 
∼N(0,σ²). The estimation takes into account the possible existence of non observable heterogeneity. From 
the econometric point of view, the estimation of the coefficients, α₀, α₁ and α₂ should take into account 
the structure of the components of the error term itε , that is, the specific effects can be treated as fixed or 
random. If the effects are independent of the explanatory variables they form part of the error term, that in 
this case will be a compound term. When there is no correlation, the random effects are used since it is 
the most efficient alternative (Arellano and Bover, 1990), otherwise the fixed effect estimator is used. To 
test whether the effects are fixed or random, the Hausman statistic is used. 
 
2.1 Data 
We use panel data from the EU Eastern enlargement process (2004-2007) where Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and 
Bulgaria and Romania were proposed for a later acceptance.9 In order to be able to analyse the pre-
accessing and post-accessing periods we take the period between 1996-2009 and include also data on EU-
15 and European Monetary Union (EMU) countries for comparison purposes.10 Data sources are Eurostat 
and European Central Bank. To eliminate size and currency effect, all variables are expressed in euros 
and scaled by population.11 We use data on cash and cards to account for the ratio of cash and non-cash 
operations (dependent variable). Short term (3-months) interest rate accounts for monetary policy as in 
Rinaldi (2001), among others. Technology level achieved in the payment systems is proxied by two 
alternative variables widely used in the retail payment systems literature (Humphrey, 2010): per capita 
Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) and per capita Electronic Fund Transfers at Point of Sale (EFT-POS). 
The model suggests that both accessing and accepting level of technology affect payment operations. To 
operationalise this, the technology level achieved by accessing countries is divided by the average 
                                                 
8
 An example of a convergence equation could be found in Lucas (2009) 
9
 From now on, when we refer to accessing countries we include all of them. 
10
 EU-15 are Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden (in membership order). Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden are not 
part of the EMU. 
11
 All variables are expressed in logs. 
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technology level of the accepting group. This ratio approaches the unity when accessing countries 
approach the accepting group. The benchmark case is the comparison between accessing countries and 
the EU-15, but since there is individual information on EMU countries, we estimate the model comparing 
accessing and EMU countries as well. 
Together with technology evolution, the model suggests that the institutional environment influences 
payment decisions. Accordingly, two alternative variables are introduced to capture the effect of 
accessing the EU. First, the candidate variable identifies the moment when the country received candidate 
status and official membership negotiations with Brussels started. Second, the accessing variable captures 
the moment when the country finally acceded.12 
Economic level is proxied by GDP per worker to control for development and economic stability, since a 
positive relationship between economic development and electronic means of payments in previous 
studies (Humphrey, 2004, among others). Table 1 collects the definitions of the main variables and 
presents some descriptive statistics. 
Table 1. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable ACCESSING 
COUNTRIES  
ACCEPTING 
COUNTRIES 
Pccurrency 657.1531 1249.556 
(per capita currency in circulation) (704.4418) (286.4857) 
Pccardop 13.9415 52.5298 
(per capita card operations) (20.2578) (4.5398) 
Pceftpos 0.0063 0.01169 
(per capita point of sale terminals) (0.0068) (0.0041) 
Pcatm 0.0003 0.0006 
(per capita atm terminals) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Pwgdp 18543.76      56978.71    
(per worker gdp) (10389.13) ( 2571.081) 
Irate 9.1054 3.0125 
(money market interest rate) (14.8071) (0.5011) 
Note: mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are reported. Source: ECB and Eurostat. 
The two columns present the mean and the standard deviation for all accessing countries and for 
accepting countries (EU-15), respectively. Some interesting differences are evidenced between both sets 
of countries and all differences are statistically significant. First, the per capita currency in circulation in 
the accepting countries nearly doubles that of the accessing ones. This preliminary positive relationship is 
in line with previous evidence such as Drehmann et al. (2002), among others. Observing the other means 
of payment, accepting countries present higher level of card operations. In this case, accepting countries 
card operations are nearly four times the operations processed in their accessing counterparts. Accepting 
countries present also higher per capita EFT-POS and ATM, suggesting that the technology applied to 
payment systems is more widespread and developed than in accessing countries. If we look at the 
evolution along the period, it is observed that card use and ATM per capita in both groups of countries 
exhibit an increasing trend and we can conclude that the accessing countries are heading towards the 
accepting ones. We have analyzed the correlation of the main variables. Some pair wise correlations are 
very high (5 out of 21 are greater than 60%), especially ATM and EFT-POS present a correlation of 83%. 
To avoid multicollinearity problems, we do not include both variables together. 
 
2.2 Results 
Results for the benchmark case are presented in Table 2, panel A. Hausman test is presented at the end of 
the table. The test rejects the correlation of the effects in all runs and consequently, the random effect 
estimator is used. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 In the estimation we take into account when the countries became members and therefore, from that moment in 
time, they are included in the accepting group. 
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Table 2. Basic Specification 
Panel A: Accepting Group European Union 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm -0.3792***  -0.4675***  -0.3792***  
 [0.0742]  [0.0756]  [0.0743]  
Eft-pos  -0.4722***  -0.5416***  -0.4722*** 
  [0.0573]  [0.0567]  [0.0573] 
Interest rate 0.3414*** 0.1791** 0.3870*** 0.1910** 0.3415*** 0.1791** 
 [0.0768] [0.0720] [0.0805] [0.0752] [0.0768] [0.0720] 
GDP -1.5284*** -1.0629*** -1.4293*** -0.9274*** -1.5284*** -1.0629*** 
 [0.2439] [0.2361] [0.2564] [0.2432] [0.2440] [0.2361] 
Accessing 0.9688*** 0.7477***   0.9688*** 0.7477*** 
 [0.2252] [0.2023]   [0.2253] [0.2023] 
Candidate   -0.1299 -1.6594*** -2.1828*** -2.0338*** 
   [0.2897] [0.3149] [0.3902] [0.3459] 
Constant 12.8996*** 8.4300*** 12.9427*** 9.4313*** 15.0825*** 10.4638*** 
 [2.4846] [2.3950] [2.4475] [2.2496] [2.3694] [2.2972] 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R2 0.62 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.66 
Hausman test 
 
9.43 6.36 5.85 1.77 9.26 6.37 
Panel B: Accepting Group European Monetary Union 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm -0.3793***  -0.4680***  -0.3794***  
 [0.0743]  [0.0756]  [0.0743]  
Eft-pos  -0.4718***  -0.5412***  -0.4718*** 
  [0.0573]  [0.0567]  [0.0573] 
Interest rate 0.3415*** 0.1792** 0.3871*** 0.1911** 0.3415*** 0.1792** 
 [0.0768] [0.0720] [0.0805] [0.0752] [0.0768] [0.0720] 
Gdp -1.5285*** -1.0632*** -1.4293*** -0.9275*** -1.5285*** -1.0632*** 
 [0.2440] [0.2362] [0.2564] [0.2433] [0.2440] [0.2362] 
Accessing 0.9688*** 0.7478***   0.9688*** 0.7478*** 
 [0.2253] [0.2023]   [0.2253] [0.2023] 
Candidate   -0.4578 -0.6290** -1.4567*** -2.2329*** 
   [0.3003] [0.2660] [0.3678] [0.3418] 
Constant 12.9669*** 8.2552*** 13.3529*** 8.1986*** 14.4236*** 10.4880*** 
 [2.4789] [2.4073] [2.4162] [2.3207] [2.3030] [2.2962] 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R2 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.66 
Hausman test 
 
9.43 6.36 6.59 5.48 9.32 6.36 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively 
We introduce ATM and EFT-POS variables one at a time. Further, the accessing and the candidate 
variable are introduced separately, except for the last two runs, columns 5 and 6. Both ATM and EFT-
POS present a negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that the higher the value of the ratio (the 
closer accessing payment technology to the European one), the lesser use of cash, that is the larger 
technology expansion, the lesser cash use, as expected from the results of the model. This result is 
consistent throughout the different specifications. EFT-POS coefficient confirms previous evidence that 
developed and widespread point of sale terminal networks reduce cash demand and use. Previous results 
on ATM are more inconclusive, some studies report a negative effect of ATM on cash use, whereas 
others present a positive effect (Stix, 2004). Our results are in line with the former. For example, 
Boeschoten (1992) for the Netherlands, Snellman et al. (2001) for several European countries and Rinaldi 
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(2001) for Belgium, find that the use of ATM reduces cash holdings and that the presence of ATM 
together with EFT-POS has a negative effect on outstanding money. These negative effects could be 
explained by the fact that the development of ATM improved the access to cash, suggesting that people 
withdraw just the amount of cash needed for small transactions in the near future, without the need to 
keep big amounts of money in their wallet, Rinaldi (2001). In line with these results, Markose and Loke 
(2003) argue that money demand functions began to break down in the late 1970s as a consequence of 
new technologies, such as EFT-POS and ATM, being introduced. This evidence confirms the result of the 
theoretical model that the use of alternative means of payment not only depends on a country's own 
technological development but on technology advances originated in the accepting countries as well. 
Further, this result agrees with Humphrey et al. (2001) who do not find evidence of a substitution effect 
between ATM and EFT-POS. 
The other relevant variable according to the model, the nominal interest rate, that accounts for the 
monetary policy, presents a positive and significant coefficient. Greater interest rates imply an increase in 
cash use with respect to card use. This result goes against evidence found in previous studies that 
highlight the negative relationship between cash and interest rates (Humphrey, 2004 and Snellman and 
Virén, 2009, among others). Along the analyzed period interest rates of accessing countries followed 
macroeconomic stabilization policies in order to meet European convergence criteria, which might have 
caused the observed behavior. Per worker GDP has a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that 
more developed countries present lower cash use, confirming previous results on international 
comparisons (Callado and Utrero, 2004 and 2007). The variables that account for the institutional 
environment are also relevant in consumer payment choice. First, the candidate variable presents a 
negative and significant coefficient both when it is introduced alone and when it is introduced together 
with the accession dummy. The prospects of entering the EU have a positive effect on card use indicating 
that is considered a positive shock for the reliability of the economic and the payment systems. It also 
reflects the fact that implementation of new payment systems started before finally entering the EU (ECB, 
1999). On the other hand, accessing variable is positive and significant, indicating that the membership 
moment impacts positively the use of cash. A possible explanation is that the success of financial reforms 
developed during the candidate status, as membership confirms, make domestic liquid assets become 
again more and more attractive, pushing upwards the ratio of broad money to GDP (Duchêne et al., 
2006). Therefore, economic level, monetary policy but also technology and institutional environment 
matters in payment decisions. 
The reference group used in the above analysis is EU-15. Afterwards, we repeat the analysis using EMU 
countries as accepting group. EU membership has changed in the last decade. However, it is the EMU 
participation that has presented more changes. As in the previous analysis, we take into account the 
individual membership changes. Results are presented in Table 2, panel B. Results confirm previous 
evidence. Economic level, monetary policy, payment system technology and institutional environment 
affect significantly payment choices. Again, technology developments foster card use. 
 
 2.3 Robustness analysis 
Here we present additional evidence to examine the robustness of the results. First, we check whether the 
results are robust to alternative variable definition or alternative proxies. In particular, we introduce 
consumption per capita and long term interest rate instead of GDP per worker and short term interest rate, 
respectively. Main conclusions remain unchanged, see Table 3. Second, we control that results are not 
driven by omitted variables. Previous empirical papers have shown that, even with the globalization of 
card use, differences among countries persist and this is due to different demographic and cultural factors. 
In particular we control for age, education, urban population, degree of innovation and crime. Some 
studies show a negative relationship between card use and age, Wasberg et al. (1992). To proxy for age, 
we introduce the percentage of school-age population (up to tertiary education). We expect a positive 
relationship, the younger you are the more cash you use. A low level of literacy and education may also 
be factors impinging on card use. Carner and Luckett (1992) show a positive relationship between 
education and card use. To proxy for education and literacy, we introduce the percentage of college 
graduates and the books published scaled by population. Kaynak and Harcar (2001) claim that card usage 
is more prevalent among urban and semi-urban areas. Traditional consumers who reside in rural areas 
may still prefer cash transactions. Accordingly, we use the percentage of urban population. More 
innovative societies are more willing to use new technologies, and therefore new methods of payments 
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will diffuse more rapidly, Humphrey (2010). 
Table 3. Robustness analysis: alternative variable definition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm -0.3542***  -0.4330***  -0.3542***  
 [0.0721]  [0.0741]  [0.0721]  
Eft-pos  -0.4574***  -0.5280***  -0.4574*** 
  [0.0606]  [0.0603]  [0.0606] 
Long term 0.4914*** 0.2607*** 0.5391*** 0.2637** 0.4914*** 0.2607*** 
Interest rate [0.0982] [0.0981] [0.1036] [0.1026] [0.0982] [0.0981] 
Consumption -1.6131*** -1.1100*** -1.5232*** -0.9652*** -1.6131*** -1.1100*** 
 [0.2665] [0.2667] [0.2805] [0.2747] [0.2665] [0.2667] 
Accessing 0.9584*** 0.7537***   0.9584*** 0.7537*** 
 [0.2188] [0.2020]   [0.2188] [0.2020] 
Candidate   -0.4018 -1.7755*** -1.4020*** -2.3747*** 
   [0.2962] [0.3166] [0.3624] [0.3455] 
Constant 11.6352*** 7.5486*** 12.0523*** 8.7061*** 13.0373*** 9.9233*** 
 [2.5121] [2.4753] [2.4344] [2.3091] [2.3171] [2.2436] 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R2 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.67 
Hausman test 
 
6.50 4.22 4.42 3.37 6.44 3.40 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively 
To proxy for innovation in society we use gross expenditure on research and development to GDP. 
Humphrey et al. (1996) find that the use of non-cash payment systems are related to per capita income, 
the availability of new payment systems and also the prevalence of violent crime within countries. In 
consequence, we control for the level of criminality (total number of violent crimes by population). 
Results are collected in Table 4. Looking at the variables of interest, it can be observed that signs and 
significance are unaltered throughout alternative specifications, meaning that results of the analysis are 
robust. Looking at the control variables introduced, there is mixed evidence. Age presents a positive and 
significant coefficient. 
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Table 4. Robustness analysis: control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Atm -0.3810***  -0.3911***  -0.3698***  -0.3558***  -0.3777***  -0.3513***  
 
[0.0707]  [0.0745]  [0.0754]  [0.0745]  [0.0759]  [0.0727]  
Eft-pos  -0.4771***  -0.5048***  -0.4675***  -0.4592***  -0.4719***  -0.4195*** 
 
 [0.0581]  [0.0572]  [0.0573]  [0.0573]  [0.0596]  [0.0589] 
Interest rate 0.3339*** 0.1802** 0.3051*** 0.1203* 0.3410*** 0.1783** 0.3404*** 0.1794** 0.3417*** 0.1866** 0.2412*** 0.1216 
 
[0.0729] [0.0729] [0.0774] [0.0723] [0.0766] [0.0718] [0.0766] [0.0722] [0.0777] [0.0722] [0.0803] [0.0756] 
Gdp -0.9114*** -1.0741*** -1.5936*** -0.9223*** -1.5615*** -1.0897*** -1.6754*** -1.1962*** -1.5396*** -1.1941*** -1.4307*** -1.1299*** 
 
[0.3253] [0.2459] [0.2610] [0.2370] [0.2483] [0.2368] [0.2641] [0.2470] [0.2460] [0.2465] [0.2436] [0.2463] 
Accessing 1.0170*** 0.7363*** 0.9756*** 0.7503*** 0.9782*** 0.7563*** 0.9882*** 0.7576*** 0.9710*** 0.7610*** 0.7979*** 0.6683*** 
 
[0.2127] [0.2053] [0.2201] [0.1962] [0.2250] [0.2019] [0.2230] [0.2020] [0.2259] [0.2020] [0.2258] [0.2043] 
Candidate -0.5716 -2.2932*** -1.8797*** -2.1850*** -1.1823*** -2.0360*** -2.1172*** -1.9645*** -1.1833*** -1.8716*** -1.3412*** -2.3092*** 
 
[0.3895] [0.3503] [0.4075] [0.3457] [0.3696] [0.3454] [0.3986] [0.3538] [0.3808] [0.3732] [0.3663] [0.3815] 
Education age  4.4351*** -0.1272           
Population [1.2078] [0.2224]           
Graduates   -0.2437* -0.3083***         
 
  [0.1280] [0.1109]         
Urban pop     -0.0425 -0.0808       
 
    [0.0867] [0.0766]       
Publish_book       0.0042 0.0417     
 
      [0.0848] [0.0748]     
R&D on gdp         -0.0034 -0.1120   
 
        [0.1728] [0.1608]   
Crime           0.7380*** 0.5442** 
 
          [0.2369] [0.2400] 
Constant -51.4940*** 12.5283*** 16.3451*** 10.3403*** 15.0393*** 11.9282*** 16.5165*** 12.0257*** 14.1927*** 11.5783*** 16.2229*** 13.5385*** 
 
[18.3873] [4.2239] [2.4765] [2.1756] [2.8737] [2.6538] [2.6791] [2.4678] [2.3483] [2.3688] [2.4105] [2.5248] 
Obs 168 168 167 167 168 168 168 168 168 168 166 166 
R2 0.62 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.63 
Hausman test 19.69*** 10.72 6.43 5.97 8.55 6.32 13.05** 16.27*** 9.13 12.41** 11.70*** 21.59*** 
***, **, * statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively 
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(column 1) meaning that the younger the population, the more cash used. Education (graduates) affects 
negatively and significantly the cash use (column 3 and 4). Crime presents a positive and significant 
coefficient, meaning that the prevalence of crime prevents card use (columns 11 and 12). On the other 
hand, the level of urban population (columns 5 and 6) and expenditure on R&D (columns 9 and 10) 
present the expected sign, more urban population and higher cultural level are associated to less cash use, 
but are not significant. Published books do not affect cash use either (columns 7 and 8). 
An additional issue in this context is the simultaneous relationship between cash and ATM (Snellman and 
Virén, 2009). To control for this potential bias, we use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. Although the above mentioned simultaneity between cash and ATM can also be controlled by 
using a simultaneous equation estimator (e.g., maximum likelihood and two- or three-stage least squares) 
our choice is based on consistency concerns. In other words, the above mentioned estimators are more 
efficient than GMM, but they are not consistent since they do not eliminate unobservable heterogeneity. 
In contrast, GMM estimation implies less efficiency, but it is consistent because it eliminates 
unobservable heterogeneity. Traditionally GMM uses first-difference transformation. However, this 
technique has a weakness. It magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2006). Arellano and Bover 
(1995) propose a second transformation 'orthogonal deviations' that minimizes data loss and since lagged 
observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments.13 Since the sample is small, we 
decide to use this transformation in order to preserve sample size. Further, to avoid over-fitting, we 
collapse the instrument matrix.14 Table 5 collects the results. 
Table 5. Robustness analysis: GMM analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Atm -0.71360***  -0.84260***  -0.71394***  
 [0.14098]  [0.13490]  [0.14138]  
Eft-pos  -0.89734***  -0.96071***  -0.89734*** 
  [0.12242]  [0.10414]  [0.12242] 
Interest rate 0.12129 -0.21057 0.1998 -0.20509 0.12272 -0.21057 
 [0.20809] [0.17895] [0.22961] [0.18193] [0.17120] [0.17895] 
Gdp -0.61756 0.33598 -0.30328 0.56391 -0.61613 0.33598 
 [0.61825] [0.72778] [0.59337] [0.69849] [0.61204] [0.72778] 
Accessing 0.79053*** 0.35058   0.78940*** 0.35058 
 [0.25497] [0.29204]   [0.28038] [0.29204] 
Candidate   -0.97931 -3.77638*** -1.76008*** -3.90526*** 
 
  [0.71050] [0.88164] [0.68012] [0.86343] 
Constant 3.93557 -5.22009 2.44620 -3.42433 5.68431 -1.31484 
 [6.25762] [7.13449] [5.52820] [6.07819] [5.56999] [6.33952] 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 
AR(1) -0.02 0.33 0.28 0.47 -0.03 0.33 
AR(2) 0.47 -0.93 0.48 -1.04 0.47 -0.93 
Hansen test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
***, **, * significant at .01, .05 and .1 respectively 
Focusing first on the diagnostic tests, Hansen's J-statistics for all specifications are too small to reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Further, AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics for first and second 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals indicate, as required, that while we can 
sometimes have evidence of first order autocorrelation, we always accept the null hypothesis of no second 
order autocorrelation. Looking at the variables of interest, as it can be seen, results are very similar to 
those presented in Table 2. ATM and EFT-POS affect negatively and significantly the cash use. The 
institutional variables maintain the sign of the coefficients, but there are some differences with respect to 
                                                 
13
 In the estimation, lagged values of cash, interest rate, GDP per worker and banking structure are introduced in 
GMM-style, while ATM and EFT-POS receive the standard treatment for endogenous variables. Further, time 
dummies are included as IV-style instruments. 
14
 We have chosen not to run two-step GMM due to well-known finite sample problems associated with the standard 
errors of two-step estimates. Indeed, two-step estimates of the model (not reported) suggest significant downward 
bias in the standard errors, even after using the Windmeijer (2005) correction. 
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the significance found in Table 2. In particular, accessing variable is only significant when ATM are 
considered, meanwhile candidate is significant when EFT-POS are introduced instead. The most 
important difference is that interest rate is no longer significant. Taking into account endogeneity issues 
in the estimation, the interest rate has negligible effect on the cash to electronic payments ratio as the 
main variable explaining its evolution is technology. Therefore, institutional variables and technology 
applied to payment systems impact payment decisions, as suggested by the model, and these results are 
robust to endogeneity. 
From the time series analysis point of view some problems may arise in the results found because part 
of the data may be non-stationary. In consequence, that would give rise to co-integration analysis and 
specification of an error-correction model. We perform a battery of panel unit root tests and in all cases, 
unit root is rejected or there is no conclusive evidence. Therefore, we consider that non-stationarity is not 
a concern in our sample. 
Conclusions 
We present a general equilibrium model on payment choice at retail level which allows us to analyze the 
evolution of consumers' payments when a country enters an economic and monetary union. The model 
shows that the relative importance of cash to electronic payments will depend on monetary policy and 
technology development. In the case of a country accessing the economic union, the effect will be based 
both on its own technology level and also on the one of the accepting group. If the less developed 
economy gradually adapts to the payment technology of the accepting countries, after the accession, the 
gap between the consumers' choices in both countries is diminishing over time. 
The implications of the model are tested in the context of the European Union enlargement process. This 
extension of the EU provides data on a natural (real) experiment where the conclusions of the model can 
be examined. Results from the econometric analysis are in line with the theoretical model. First, 
technology is the main factor driving the consumers' payment choice. In particular, technology 
development relative to the accepting countries indicates that the closer the accessing payment technology 
to the European one, the lesser use of cash. Second, when controlling for endogeneity issues, the interest 
rate is not relevant in explaining the ratio of cash to electronic payments. This fact clearly reinforces the 
role of technology in the analysis. Third, the variables that account for the institutional environment are 
significant, even when endogeneity issue is considered. The expectation of accessing to the EU, together 
with the fact that the implementation of new payment systems started before finally accessing the union, 
is considered a positive shock for the reliability of the economic and payment systems and therefore, 
affects payment instrument choice. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques, alternative 
variable definition, different accepting group and the introduction of additional controls.  
This paper provides particular evidence for the case of payment systems and consumers' payment 
instrument choice. It is shown that by intensively adapting payment technology to relatively higher 
standards, countries' payment instrument use can be influenced accordingly. This adaptation can be 
clearly favored by the new institutional environment and structural transformation required by the 
integration into an economic union. 
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